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review by Fabio Ceravolo, Enrico Cinti, Dario Mortini
1 Why StarWars and Philosophy?
This book is impressively vast and engaging. Whether it should be called an
impressively vast and engaging contribution to the philosophy of Star Wars de-
pends on there being something as “a philosophy of Star Wars”, a matter on
whichmany raise doubts. These doubters are intellectually far far away from the
volume’s essayists and the present reviewers - they raise their eyebrows unim-
pressed by the statement that writing on Star Wars counts as a contribution
to philosophy much like we raise our eyebrows unimpressed at each out-of-
context occurrence of some catchphrase from Game of Thrones.
The volume does not do much to justify its own existence, so let us try to
bring some help to the cause. Joining an elite selection of 20th century artistic
production, the Star Wars material is first and foremost didactically useful. It
stimulates the needs of philosophical younglings for philosophical mumbling.
A quick research also shows that the Internet is overfilled with discussions over,
say, the nature of the Force, the moral commitments of the Jedi, the democratic
limits of theNewRepublic, and so forth. Yet thevastmajorityof the forums’users
is philosophically quite illiterate. This book, we believe, is a successful attempt
to guide them to the analytic core of their reflections.
Second, the book performs an aetiological task, as it aims at bringing out
the reasons behind George Lucas’ narrative choices. Very good narratives often
evoke a sense of puzzlement, towards which one can gain a vantage point by
retorting to philosophical ‘detail’. Our impression as philosophers and StarWars
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lovers is that, when it comes to intrinsically philosophical matters, Lucas’ take
is not too different from that of the forum users or other science-fiction writers
- proof of this is the richness in philosophical motives of some fan fictions, as
well as of the (previously canonical) Expanded Universe novels. Micheal Dunn,
one of the contributors to this volume (p. 202), makes a reasonable point as
he says: “As an artist, Lucas takes his bearings from human experience rather
than abstract reason”. But [. . . ] “Philosophers have always aspired to uncover
an underlying unity behind the cluttered mess of our experience”. The way we
see it, one should add to this consideration that “abstract reason” complements
Lucas’ vision in a way highly enjoyable to us role-players. For reflecting on the
topics emerging out of Lucas’ unguided intuitions means as much as bringing
a contribution to his own universe. Hardly anything is more enjoyable to a fan
than truly feeling a live part of the Star Wars universe.
Beyond these merits, the book contains an impressive collection of essays
on a number of topics. Among these, normative ethics is markedly predomi-
nant. A minor role is played by metaphysics, philosophy of language, artificial
intelligence andhermeneutics. The expanded 2016 edition also contains critical
reflections on Star Wars’ famously controversial portrayal of female characters.
Asmuch aswewould have liked to discuss each contribution exhaustively, some
had to be sacrificed for reasons of space. We hope however that the above dis-
cussion will capture the readers’ interest and lead them to independent study,
or at least tomake use of some enhanced reflections in the context of a good old
Star Warsmarathon.
2 The Philosophical Menace
In “The Platonic Paradox of Darth Plagueis: How Could a Sith Lord Be Wise?”,
TerranceMacMullanasksus to imaginePlatoandNietszchecrossing lightsabers.
What is the path of the wise man? Pursuing knowledge through the practical
guide of reason or pursuing power through subduing our subordinates’ will to
our aims and ambitions? There is little doubt here: Plato’s saber emanates ar-
dent, profound blue light - his stance steady, his determination unfluctuating.
Nietzsche’s burns with vermillion thunder.
Now, Star Wars systematically warns against the consequences of Nitzsche’s
path. Even those with a superficial knowledge of the brand will have heard that
fear, hatred and anger are steps along the path to the Dark Side. However, for
the Sith, the followers of the Dark Side, this narrative is question begging and
unjustified the Platonic assumption that all practical consequences of a the-
ory of wisdom should be morally good. Not to mention that one of the great-
est Sith Lords ever to be born, a creature whose mastery of the Force surpassed
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even Yoda’s, consciously rejected this assumption, yet he named himself Darth
Plagueis the wise. The existence of someone like Plagueis raises a problem for
the Platonic view. For Plagueis agreed with the Jedi on practice being guided
by rational rather than impulsive control over the Force. But he denied that the
resulting effects should be classified as either good or evil.
In “You are Asking Me to be Rational: Stoic Philosophy and the Jedi Order”,
Matt Hummel sides with the Jedi on the use of the Force being a morally laden
action. Hummel does not discuss the case of Plagueis, but hewouldmost proba-
bly say that the latter deceived himself by claimed to possesswisdom alongwith
refusing to attribute any moral significance to his actions.
The argument comes from the Stoics and has it that moral goodness is man-
ifested through happiness and lack of suffering. When we become conscious
that most things are not in our control and that what is not in control is a cause
of suffering, we discover that being in control exclusively of what can be con-
trolled just is moral goodness, as it enhances happiness over suffering. The Sith
destroy themselves by trying to control the uncontrollable.
Hummell turns to the criticismmost insisted upon in Lucas’ work: it follows
from the Jedi creed that human love and the wish for eternal life should be dis-
missed as uncontrollable attachments. One may be tempted of turning tables
against the Jedi in virtue of the fact that the Jedi suffer just as much as the Sith
by having to renounce love and immortality. But for Hummell, whether a Jedi
suffers depends on their mind being well-trained, whichmeans: capable of sys-
tematically framing individual events into bigger pictures.
The Jedi would say that choices made for the sake of the universe are exactly
those not guided by selfish desires. However, we can hardly see how choices
can be characterised so nearly: some actions will take place for the sake of the
universe even if guided by selfish fears and desires. In particular, it is not clear
whether the Plagueis paradox dissolves, as the Sith pursued personal immor-
tality and power exactly because he was moved to exert control over ignorant
people; exactly for the sake of the entire universe - at least according to his vi-
sion.
Even Jedi like Anakin Skywalker have faced the danger and the consequences
of violent passions such as love, loss and vengeance. The aim of “LikeMy Father
before Me: Loss and Redemption of Fatherhood in Star Wars”, by Charles Talia-
ferro and Annika Beck, is to propose an account of love and goodness, in order
to better understand the complicated relation between Anakin Skywalker and
his emotions. Anakin’s will to protect people he loves at all costs and his attach-
ment to Shmi and Padmè led the Jedi hero to a tormented path. A possible ther-
apy for such lack of self-control is offered by Yoda. As the authors suggest, the
counsels of the little green Jedi Master are very similar to Stoic moral principles:
he admonishes Anakin to avoid dangerous attachments, he warns him not to
RivistaItalianadiFilosofiaAnaliticaJunior
7:1
(2016)
91
Fabio Ceravolo, Enrico Cinti, Dario Mortini The Ultimate Star Wars Philosophy
pursue apparent goods such as power and to control his emotions. The authors
brilliantly highlight the similarities between Jedi code and a constant feature of
bothWestern andOriental Philosophy, which is namely the connectionbetween
wisdom and unattachment.
Kevin S. Decker further pursues a comparative line in “The End of the Re-
public and the Beginning of Chinese Philosophy”. His aim is to offer a parallel
between the early Chinese philosophy and the worldviews of certain characters
inhabiting the Star Wars universe during the the period between the rise of the
Empire and its fall. All of them are Jedi, and thus they are hunted down by the
empire, who aims at eliminating all light side users from the galaxy. The paper’s
interest seems to lie more in its narration of the characters’ lives, which is pur-
sued in great detail, rather than in the ideas developed. However, the parallel
between Star Wars and Chinese philosophy looks extremely promising on the
side of contents and deserves further development.
3 Attack of theMorals
It is just a matter of time before the much-scorned Jar-Jar Binks makes his ap-
pearance in the volume. In “HowGuilty is Jar Jar Binks”, NicholasMichaud tack-
les the questionwhether the annoying creature should be judged responsible for
consenting to the Galactic Empire’s formation, and the death of billions of for-
mer Republicans alongwith it. Notoriously1, Jar-Jar takes a careless approach to
moral decisionmaking - he hardly realises the consequences of his actions. Can
he be blamed?
Michaud opts for amixture of Kantian andNagelian theses. Intention is nec-
essary and sufficient for determiningmoral responsibility - onemust onlymea-
sure whether Jar-Jar was trying to be good in order to fix whether he is culpable
or not. However, when it comes to the epistemic question of how Jar-Jar inten-
tions are made accessible to others (e.g., to the judges that might put him on
trial), the consequences are the only partially reliable indicator.
Two further essays on the moral status of Star Wars characters are “Of Battle
Droids and Zillo Beasts: Moral Status in the Star Wars Galaxy” by James Okapal
and “Mindless Philosophers and Overweight Globs of Grease: Are Droids Ca-
pable of Thought?” by Dan Burket. Okapal shows great knowledge of different
theories of morality: he quotes Rosalind Hurshouse’s division between morally
considerable beings inside the circle of moral status, and mere things which
standout of it; he develops an important distinction, assessed toBenjaminHale,
between moral considerability, moral relevance and moral significance, and he
1The rumors have it that Jar-Jar’s obliviousness in Episode III is a feature consciously devised by
Lucas, partly in order to enhance the fandom’s rising annoyance towards Jar-Jar.
RivistaItalianadiFilosofiaAnaliticaJunior
7:1
(2016)
92
Fabio Ceravolo, Enrico Cinti, Dario Mortini The Ultimate Star Wars Philosophy
assigns each of them to different species and characters of Star Wars, also dis-
cussing the various criteria which contribute to the definition of what ismorally
significant, considerable and relevant.
Continuing on this line, Burkett enquires the capability of thought and emo-
tionsofdroids, inorder todeterminewhich is (andwhich shouldbe) their proper
moral and social status in Star Wars. The reader is familiar with the pessimistic
lines of Threepio: the robot often claims how sad and hard his life is, he keeps
complaining about his pains and misadventures, and he even admits his con-
cern for Luke, Princess Leia and R2-D2. Nevertheless, despite such intense (and
human) feelings the droids are usually treated as mere objects: they are bought
and sold, used and destroyed during wars and explicitly considered less impor-
tant than biological life forms.
For these reasons, the author reviews Searle’s famous Chinese Room exper-
iment (here remarkably renamed Bocce Room, quoting the famous Tatooine’s
robot language). Burket tries to turn Searle’s argument against Searle: by high-
lighting the affinity between humans andmachines with respect to behavioural
interaction as a consequence of language-learning, the author suggest that it
would be more correct to consider droids at least capable of human behaviour,
like Threepio proves, without treating them as second-class beings.
William Lindenmuth describes a different complexity inhabiting the ethics
of Jedi in “The Jedi Knights of Faith: Anakin, Luke and Sören (Kierkegaard)”. The
movie constantly refers to the Force having a “will”, and to the will of the Force
as being one for the good. How come then, that the Force wills Luke to kill his
own father?
Once again, one can respond that the will of the Force is always aimed at the
entire universe’s sake andprevails over the individuals’ selfishdesires. According
to this interpretation, Luke’s actions in Episode VI would count as disagreeing
the Force’s commands - revealing a selfish nature similar to that which guided
his father to the Dark Side.
A different interpretation has it that Luke’s actions “brought balance to the
Force” rather than straightforwardly disagreeing with its commands. Darth Sid-
ious, who witnesses the duel, spurs Luke to kill his father because he thinks that
this course of actions would finally lead the yound Skywalker to the Dark Side.
However, the killing of Vader is also the same course of events that would bring
the most gain to the Light Side. The act of bringing balance cannot be the act
that command both themost of good and themost of evil. It must be a different
act, unexpected to occur in the relevant context, that generates neither of the
two outputs.
Lindenmuth’s is probably the essay that most closely gets at the main issues
of Episode VII (which is remarkable, given that the volume has been published
before the episode’s release). In Episode VII, it is questioned whether Luke ac-
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tually brought the Force into balance, and it is hinted that the answer depends
on the real nature of the Force. Suppose that the Force has a will for good and a
will for evil, each realised by a Light and Dark “component” (for this Manichean
view of the Force, see George Dunn’s contribution, pp. 195-208). Rather than
manifesting a “lack of will” of the Light Side, the Dark Side has its own indepen-
dent will. In this case, it is the will that Luke gains hatred through killing Vader.
The Light Side also wills Vader’s death rather than his redemption, but this time
because of the universe’s sake. In this perspective, Luke’s final decision is a way
of bringing balance to the Force exactly in the way envisaged by Lindemuth, as
it manifests a course of action independent of either will (Questions: what else
aside from the Force itself can bring balance to the Force? If it is the Force itself,
which of its sides is operating? Neither the Dark nor the Light, it seems. But can
something other than the Dark or Light Side have a will of its own?).
On the other hand, suppose that the Force has only a will for the good, and
that the Dark Side manifests as “lack of light” in all courses of events in which
the Force is not “sufficiently present” for willing the good. In this view, “bringing
balance to the Force” and fulfilling the will of the Force simply mean the same:
executing Vader. Hence Luke has not brought balance to the Force. As far as
we currently know from Episode VII, and given especially the narrative veil laid
by director J.J. Abrams on Luke’s true intentions, both interpretations are still
equally possible (and suggest intriguing speculations).
4 Revenge of the Alliance
In “Light Side, Dark Side and Switching Sides: Loyalty andBetrayal in StarWars”,
Daniel Malloy argues that loyalty is neither necessary nor sufficient to guide
righteous action.
Loyalty dictates roughly that one’s course of action is directed to the preser-
vation of an ideal, or the aims of a group of people. One can see the failure of
sufficiency very easily: Stormtroopers are blindly loyal to the Empire, but their
actions can hardly be righteous. It is more difficult to show the failure of neces-
sity, but Malloy makes a convincing case that, even if loyalty were necessary to
righteousness, it often conflicts with further loyalties in such away that the con-
flict is solved by independent moral reasons. For example (p. 145): “If betraying
A will lead to A’s death, while betraying B will lead to B losing somemoney, then
I should betray B”. Malloy retorts to the claim that the value of loyalty rests in its
explainingwhat righteous action is - for righteous action and loyalty share some
features: chiefly, sacrificing selfish desires for the well-being of others.
However (as he acknowledges) if this view is correct, it entails that the Sith
cannot be loyal. For the SithOrder promotes the individual acquisition of power
over any other value and a part of the Sith’s “duty” to their Order consists thus
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in betraying their master for the sake of acquiring new power. Can we call this
proper loyalty?
“Guardians and Tyrants in the Republics of Star Wars and Plato”, by Adam
Barkman and Kyle Alkema, claims that the wisest governors are the “lightsaber-
wielding philosophers”, in clear analogy with the Platonic guardians. The rise
of the Empire should be traced in the faulty democratic institutions of the Old
Republic - the Senate being constantly impeded by the recklessness of elected
politicians and the Jedi Council systematically deviated to issues of secondary
importance. Among the main traits of a guardian are the ability to obey superi-
ors, control emotions and give up attachments. Barkman and Alkema, however,
further add that the Jedi are distinguished from the Sith in that they lack the
ambition to be rulers. In spite of their lack of ambition, they will be suitable for
holdingpolitical power exactly because their excellence as guardians allow them
to conceive of such power as a duty rather than a gain.
In “Chasing Kevin Smith: Was It Immoral for the Rebel Alliance to Destroy
DeathStar II ?”, CharlesC.Camosyholds that thedestructionof the secondDeath
Star was a morally justified act on the rebels’ part. Camosy’s argument is con-
cerned first with defining what a terrorist attack is, since this is usually how the
accuse against the rebels is framed, and then with evaluating if they can be con-
sideredmorally guilty for their attack. First of all, he rejects autilitarianapproach
for defining terrorist attacks, and choses a justwar framework. He thenproceeds
to define a terrorist attack as an act purposefully directed at causing deaths be-
tween innocent civilians in order to reach some goal. Under this definition of
terrorist attack, the rebels cannot possibly be considered terrorists, for theywere
directly aiming only at the destruction of the Death Star and not at the killing of
civilians. Camosy then proceeds to ask whether the Death Star’s employee were
innocent or not, and his answer is positive. For the majority of them were ei-
ther clones or droids, and none ever had any choice regarding what to do (even
if it’s controversial whether or not droids actually count as people). In spite of
this, the rebels’ attack remainsmorally justified in that the potential damage for
the galaxy coming for a fully operative second death star was such that even the
death of millions of innocents was a price worth paying.
We think that this point looks especially controversial in that it reintroduces a
utilitarian criterion into the picture. Also, we are not sure that the proposed def-
inition completely captures the intension of terrorism. More in general, the ar-
gument seems to suffer from the “good guys lens” complex aboutwhichCamosy
talks in the end, the fact that we tend to always justify the rebels because of their
leading protagonists’ role in the Star Wars narratives.
“TheBalladofBobaFett: MercenaryAgencyandAmoralism inWar”, byDavid
LaRocca, aims at exploring Boba Fett’s moral status, and then expands the con-
clusions to the broader case of themoral status ofmercenaries and their deploy-
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ment in war contexts. After a digression on the character’s history, the author
introduces his main thesis: Fett is not a moral relativist, despite he might first
look one such given his position as an intermediary between the Empire and
the rebels. Instead, the author describes Fett as an amoralist, someone who has
purposefully removedhimself from themoral discourse. Fett does not think that
both parties have their reasons, he does not weigh their relative merits, he does
not care about moral judgements and does not himself have any type of moral
opinion. The author then proceeds to take the consequences of his analysis of
Fett into the realm of the contemporary use ofmercenaries in war contexts. The
question thus becomes if mercenaries are necessarily amoral and thus gener-
ally bad, or if it is possible for there to be a goodmercenary. A question to which
the author answers that yes, there could be a goodmercenary, and also that the
standard ways to distinguish mercenaries and soldiers may not be as effective
as wemight think. This prompts a wider reflection on whether or not we should
rethink our moral assessment of the parties involved in mercenary contracts, a
State and themercenary itself, and on how this might think our judgement over
Boba Fett.
5 Nature of the Force (Metaphysics and Epistemol-
ogy)
A number of papers address the problem of evil in relation to the theodicy of
the Force. Drawing upon dramatically contrasting information from both the
movies and the Expanded Universe, it turns out that we know disappointingly
little about theForce’snatureandagency2. For example, asGeorgeDunnstresses
in “Why the Force Must Have a Dark Side”, Star Wars does not settle whether
events brought about by the will of the Force are good or evil (neutralism). Nor,
supposing such events aremorally laden, does it decide whether their being evil
can be explained away by evil being the absence of goodness (Augustine’s pri-
vation theory). Dunnwishes to defend a specific stance, according to which evil
obtains because theDark Side is a potential part of the Light Side. TheDark Side
has a will of its own, but this will can only be active insofar as the Light Side is
not. The capacity of the Force to will something is determined at each time by
thedominating component. Thus, it takes conscious effort by the Sith to liberate
the Dark Side from the boundaries of light. Strinkingly, this view comes closest
to the picture of the Force emerging from Episode VII, as Kylo Ren confesses to
be “tempted” by the Light Side.
An Augustinian view is defended by Jason Eberl in “Know the Dark Side: A
2Wepermit ourselves to claim that themost excitingpromise of the forthcoming trilogy (Episodes
VII- IX) consists in fixing a canonical answer to these questions.
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Theodicy of the Force”. Here the Force itself becomes the equivalent in the Star
Wars universe of what God is in monotheistic Semitic religions. The Force thus
possesses a will and a plan for the universe, and the Dark Side is understood as
‘merely’a lack of light. Eberl then proceeds to analyze Anakin’s turn to the Dark
Side, which, in the Augustinian framework, is caused by his inordinate desire to
save Padme’s life, and his inability to detach himself from transient goods to em-
brace the true love of God, or the Force. Anakin’s love, however, is not inherently
wrong, but is better described as not rightly ordered, for he puts his beloved’s
life above the Force. Overall, the paper was not totally convincing. First of all, it
inherits the problems inherent to Augustine’s philosophy, which by itself might
make the thesis quite unstable. Not only this, but the comparison between the
Force and the semitic God seems too excessive for it not to be justified by argu-
ment. Indeed, it seems that the yet fruitful idea of developing a theodicy of the
Force should start off fromsimilar considerations before even coming to address
the problem of evil.
A different yet very interesting paper addressing the nature of the Force is
“What Is It Like to Be a Jedi? A Life in the Force”, in which Marek McGann at-
tempts to describe the phenomenal character or quale associated with manip-
ulating the Force. To do this, he avails himself of the work of Maurice Merlau-
Ponty as well as of recent developments in cognitive science regarding the no-
tion of embodied cognition. McGann aims at explaining what it means that a
Jedi can feel the Force, and how something similar to this feeling might appear
in our everyday experience. He claims that the experience of the Force is not
simply some kind of meditative act, it is a physical, bodily act, necessarily inter-
twined with the fact that we are made of meat and bones, and that we are con-
stantly embodied, as was stressed byMerlau-Ponty. The Force is something that
is felt through the body, is a flow that someonemoves along, not something that
is merely perceived. His final claim is that, since this embodied point of view
is not exclusive of the Force, but is common to all our experience, this shared
feature shows the main characteristic of the Jedi’s experience of the Force, and
at the same time its connection with everyday experience. This article’s idea has
certainly some merit, even if in this analysis the spiritual activity required for
perceiving the Force seems to be relinquished as a consequence of its reduction
to a bodily aspect. Given the importance of spirituality for Force-users and for
the nature of the Force itself, this probablymakes this analysis incomplete. Still,
it argues convincingly that the Force is not purely spiritual, and gives a partial
solution to the problem of how it can interact with the physical universe.
“Never Tell Me the Odds”: An Inquiry Concerning Jedi Understanding”, by
AndrewZimmerman Jones, is centered around the epistemological status of un-
derstanding the Force, an ability that characters in the Star Wars universe claim
to possess. Zimmerman Jones focuses on Han Solo’s famous skepticism, which
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he compares to David Hume’s equally famous skeptic attitude. Giving the due
credit to Solo andHume, he concludes by proposing that the best way to under-
stand the epistemology of the Force is through fallibilist principles. The author
argues that Solo’s lack of belief in the existence of the Force, although false, can
still be considered justified, for the smuggler never had any evidence that the
Force could possibly exist. Furthermotivation for this claim is found in thework
of Hume, and specifically in his argument against the possibility of miracles. In
a Humean perspective, then, Han’s lack of evidence for a belief in something
that was no different from a miracle was reason enough for him to be justified
in his skepticism. The author thenmoves on to question whether or not the Jedi
can actually say that they know the Force according to this standard. He de-
fines their knowledge as based on inductive reasoning. And because of this he
raises the problem of induction against the Jedi’s knowledge of the Force, before
proceeding to solving it by appeal to fallibilist principles, according to which no
knowledge can be absolutely certain, but is rather always fallible.
It is striking that the author bases his analysis on the view that knowledge is
justified true belief, which is highly discredited inmodern epistemology. At least
acknowledging this problemand explainingwhy it is not relevant to his analysis,
if it is so, would have been a wise choice.
6 Return of the non-Human
The essay “Can Chewie Speak? Wittgenstein and the Philosophy of Language”,
by Rhiannon Grant and Myfanwy Reynolds, is highly recommended for both
philosophers of language and Wookie lovers. Easily readable, this essay about
the fierce and loyal hairy Chewbacca is packed with humour. Chewie is an im-
portant part of our popular culture: We all remember very well his wild screams
during a fight on the Death Star, or the softer noises of his displays of affection
towards Leia or Han. Nevertheless, from a linguistic point view, it is hard to say
whether such sounds actually count as a language. In the ExpandedUniversewe
learn thatWookie dohave their own language, called Shyriiwook, but in this case
the problem is different, and as the authors suggest, it leads directly to philo-
sophical considerations: in fact, we are not merely looking for the existence of a
Wookie language, but rather we are trying to understand whether this language
actually has a meaning. Can Chewbecca really speak? If yes, how could we con-
sider his screams as a real language?
Such analysis draws the readers back to the proper criteria for defining a lan-
guage, and the authors provide two different options. On one hand, as Chomsky
pointed out, a genuine language is composed of utterances organized by a syn-
tax, a structure and a grammar. Accordingly, Chewie’s screams and growls do
notmake him capable of speaking, since he has no grammar nor rules. Actually,
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accepting the Chomskian perspective, we risk to be rather disappointed: are we
really eager to admit that our beloved Wookie does not speak? This would be
clearly in contrast with our basic intuitions on the movies, since we actually see
Chewie and Han communicating with each other.
In this philosophical danger, Wittgenstein might come to our aid, proving
himself aWookie’s saviour like Yodaduring theBattle of Kashyyk. As it is renown,
after a period of loneliness and meditation that the authors compare to Obi
Wan’s exile on Tatooine, Wittengestein abandoned his pictorial theory of a per-
fect and ideal language proposed in his Tractatus in order to embrace a new
theory, now grounded on use and context. Highlighting the nature of language
games andof social aspects of language, the authors provide a new criterion that
allows the Wookie not to speak a language, but at least to communicate.
Another remarkable passage of the essay consists in a funny comparison be-
tweenWittgenstein’s thesis on the impossibility of a private language and a situ-
ation that ObiWanmight have possibly faced during his exile in Tatooine. Given
the importance of the social aspects of language, every new word needs to un-
dergoacheckingprocedureof the languagecommunitywhichprovides the rules
of the use of such newword: had ObiWan invented a newword in his lonely hut
in the desert in order to describe a disturbance in the Force, he would always
lack of the public checking procedure that a real language necessarily needs.
Even the most skilled Jedi must take into account the undeniable social aspect
of language.
Finally, the two authors remind us the importance of the fictional setting
for their analysis: whatever the language may be (Star Trek’s Klingon, Tolkien’s
Quenya or Chewie’s Shyriiwook), it is more correct to say that Chewbecca can
convey information and communicate merely in the movies, not absolutely. All
the many different languages of Star Wars represent a case study for philoso-
phers who claim, followingWittgenstein, that more important is whether a lan-
guage is socially understood, rather than what is simply said.
This very last important remarkconcerning the importanceof afictional con-
text connects directly to “Star Wars: Emotions and the Paradox of Fiction” by
Lance Belluomini. Here the readers are introduced to three theories of fiction,
which differently explain how we can feel real emotions for non-existent fic-
tional characters. For every fan, even the toughest, this is an undeniable fact:
we clearly feel strong and intense emotions for the characters, although neither
Luke Skywalker nor Obi Wan Kenobi (and, luckily, not even Jar Jar), do actually
exist and never will.
In the opening, the author provides three claims which jointly express the
paradox of fiction:
1. We have genuine and rational emotional responses to the fictional charac-
ters and events in Star Wars.
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2. In order to have genuine and rational emotional responses, we must be-
lieve these characters and events really exist.
3. Nobody believes these fictional characters and events in Star Wars exist.
Every solution will present costs and benefits. The first attempt to solve the
paradox comes from the famous English poet S. T. Coleridge: he proposed an
illusion theory, according to which each fictional work creates in the viewers the
illusion that characters and situations described really exist. The second pro-
posal, the thought theory, connects our rational emotions to our mental repre-
sentation of fictional characters and events. Finally, the author discusses a clas-
sic in the philosophy of fiction, Walton’s pretend theory. On the whole, none of
the three theories is able to solve the paradox. Nevertheless, the author con-
cludes the essay with a simple but effective proposal which draws the attention
of the reader on the terminologyof theparadox: Claim1 refers to “rational” emo-
tions, and this might be amistake. Probably, as it is finally pointed out, our feel-
ing of pity for a tortured Luke Skywalker is not a reasonable nor a rational re-
sponse, since we are just imaging the scene, and neither Luke nor Mark Hamill
(the actor who portrays the young Jedi) are really in danger.
7 Conclusion
Lightsabers, Jedi and Siths, the power of the Force, the rise of the Empire and
the victory of the Rebellion have always caught our attention. But they didmore
than trigger a loudheartbeat: they gave rise to another kindofmental awakening
(have you felt it?), giving us a precious chance to meditate upon the underlying
narratives. This book shows most effectively that such contemplation and re-
flection leads straightforwardly to rigorous philosophical thought, of a kind to
be cultivated by anyone who shares the sense of wonder transmitted by Lucas’
universe.
One last admonition. It is rather hard to overcome the feeling of excitement
aroused by Star Wars’ most eventful scenes: the lightsaber duels, the Podracers
chases, the explosions of the (many) Death Star(s), and so forth. But we firmly
believe true philosophers to be Jedi, that is, heroes who have no doubt that a life
led by excitement alone is the first step to the Dark Side (yes, we are slightly sug-
gesting that emotionally-driven modes of doing philosophy go under the label
of ‘Sith philosophy’, and especially those in which the claimed grandeur of the
aims collides with methods that are rigorous, if yet painful and hard to learn).
Therefore, while the amount of questions arising from Star Wars is astonishing,
andwhile wemay deeply enjoy being a live part of a universemade up of droids,
aliens, spaceships and Jedi like ourselves, at the same timewe long for analysing
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each of its elements, rather than solely vaguely invoking their fantastic character
and that of the narratives surrounding them.
